On Pearce's framing, three problems are one: the measurement problem in quantum mechanics, the phenomenal binding problem in neuroscience, and the mystery of why anything exists at all — the shared thread being that reality is exhaustively described by unitary evolution of one universal wavefunction, while experience discloses the intrinsic nature of that formalism (Pearce, Why Does Anything Exist?, physicalism.com). Given wavefunction monism, "collapse" is a linguistic convenience; decoherence scrambles phase relations but never literally destroys superpositions (Pearce, IAI). What naive realists call the world — solid, medium-sized objects occupying definite places, yielding single definite outcomes — is instead the content of a data-driven world-simulation run by the CNS (Quora answers). Crucially, on this conjecture the content of waking experience is classical while the vehicle is inescapably quantum: waking organisms are "quantum minds running subjectively classical world-simulations," and only quantum superpositions are ever experienced (Quora answers, Does physicalism entail monistic idealism?).
So the question becomes: why would natural selection build simulators whose contents are definite objects rather than, say, complex amplitude fields?
Why phenomenology represents definite objects
1. Selection rewards fitness, not veridicality. Perception evolved to guide fitness-relevant action, not to deliver metaphysical correspondence. A perceptual format is selected purely by whether it promotes survival and reproduction; nothing in the selection pressure cares whether the format mirrors the underlying state vector (physicalism.com).
2. The ecological niche is already effectively classical — a sufficient statistic. Decoherence means the macroscopic variables that matter to an animal — a predator's position, a branch's rigidity — are robustly recorded in the environment as pointer states, redundantly copied countless times (Zurek's "quantum Darwinism"). For an organism with reaction times of milliseconds to seconds, the interference structure of the underlying amplitudes is fitness-irrelevant; the stable, coarse-grained branch-relative statistics are everything. A representation of definite objects is therefore a sufficient statistic for fitness: it preserves all the actionable information while discarding the ~10²⁶-dimensional phase detail no animal could use (Quora answers).
3. Compression under metabolic and temporal budgets. Brains run on roughly 20 watts. Explicitly representing amplitude structure is exponentially costly; representing "leopard, there, closing fast" costs a handful of bits. Selection for speed, reliability, and energy efficiency ruthlessly favours lossy compression — and definite, bounded, mutually exclusive objects are the natural compression format, because each object must be individually addressable to be individually acted upon (Quora answers).
4. Action demands committed contents. Motor output must be one coordinated act, not a superposition of acts. Affordances are definite: a surface either bears your weight or it doesn't. An organism whose perceptual format represented naked indeterminacy would dither; one that commits to definite contents and fast, coarse decisions outcompetes it. Note that organisms do track uncertainty — but only classical uncertainty (probabilities over definite states), never phase-sensitive amplitudes, precisely because decoherence destroys the phase structure before it could ever acquire fitness relevance.
5. Naive realism itself is the adaptive reflex. Selection shaped not just the world-simulation but our meta-cognition to believe we enjoy direct access to mind-independent objects. An organism that constantly doubted its interface would be paralysed; the introspective conviction of direct realism was never tested against alternatives because doubting it had no payoff. Distinguishing the empirical skull you can feel from the transcendental skull that actually encases the simulation requires lucid dreaming or science — not survival (Quora answers).
The inversion: why the illusion is a signature of quantum reality
Here the conjecture gets interesting. On an Everettian reading, definiteness of content is what a branch-relative observer is: each transcendent observer-state in the universal superposition experiences a single clean outcome, while the global amplitude never collapses. The classicality of our world-simulations is thus the mind-dependent signature of the quantum "weirdness" — the answer to "where does all the weirdness go?" is "under our virtual noses" (physicalism.com, Does physicalism entail monistic idealism?).
The same dynamics solves the preferred-basis problem. The environment's einselection doesn't merely pick out robust pointer states; it picks out exactly the fitness-relevant macro-variables animals must track. The basis of experience and the basis of survival-relevant records coincide because they are shaped by the same decoherence dynamics — what Pearce describes as quantum Darwinism applied to the CNS, a selection mechanism "sculpting" quadrillions of neuronal cat states into a coherent classical-seeming simulation (Quora answers).
What evolution explains — and what it doesn't
The evolutionary story explains why the contents are classical: fitness, compression, and action jointly guarantee that any successful world-simulation will traffic in definite objects. What it cannot explain is why the simulation is experienced at all, or how distributively processed neuronal features bind into unitary phenomenal objects at all — the binding problem. Pearce's answer is that binding is what consciousness is evolutionarily for: without the superposition principle, minds couldn't simulate fitness-relevant patterns, and superpositions of feature-processing neurons — not live-and-dead cats — are the individual states that get bound (Qualia Computing, Does physicalism entail monistic idealism?). On this view the classical content is the adaptation, while the quantum vehicle is the enabling mechanism — and, audaciously, if the world were classical it wouldn't look like anything to anyone (Does physicalism entail monistic idealism?).
That last claim is where the conjecture outruns the evolutionary argument and becomes empirical. Tegmark-style decoherence calculations say warm-brain neuronal superpositions should decohere in ~10⁻¹³ s, which is why most neuroscientists never take the idea seriously. Pearce's response is that this is not a settled calculation but a testable prediction: next-generation molecular matter-wave interferometry should either reveal the expected interference signatures of neuronal cat states or refute the conjecture to everyone's satisfaction (Quora answers, physicalism.com). There is also a softer, theory-neutral test: evolutionary robotics — evolving artificial agents in simulated quantum environments — can independently confirm the weaker thesis that classical-object representations emerge as the optimal fitness compression, whatever one believes about the vehicle.
Verdict
Yes — the classical world of naive realism can be coherently construed as an adaptive phenomenal illusion, and the evolutionary explanation is strong as far as it goes: decoherence makes the niche a redundant classical record; selection for fitness, speed, and energy budgets makes definite objects the optimal compression of that record; action requires committed contents; and naive realism about those contents is itself an unexamined adaptive default. What remains genuinely mysterious — the third and deepest layer — is why there is a vehicle of experience at all, and why it binds. The conjecture's wager is that the same formalism answers all three questions at once, and that physics, not philosophy, will settle it.
Nov 1, 8:30am
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