Here's a candid outline, since some of this may be useful for the second-edition work (No access). Most of these are tensions rather than outright contradictions — points where two commitments pull against each other — but each has generated criticism.

1. Suffering-focus vs. rejecting NU's conclusions

You're associated with negative utilitarianism, yet you explicitly refuse the strict lexical version's bullet-biting (painless extinction to preclude any suffering; the pinprick argument). Your response — weak NU, and the claim that classical and negative utilitarianism converge post-abolition — can look like deferring the problem to a technological future rather than resolving it. Critics ask: either suffering lexically dominates (then abolition at almost any cost) or aggregate hedonic tone rules (then NUism is not really your view).

2. Abolition of suffering vs. preservation of everything else

The claim that recalibrating hedonic set-points is orthogonal to our other values — that post-humans retain science, art, relationships, "all else equal" — rests on an empirical bet that mood can be decoupled from motivation and cognition. Current evidence (dopamine's roles, euphoria-induced apathy, mania) cuts the other way. There's an internal tension between your deference to science and your optimism that hedonic tone is a cleanly separable dial.

3. Compassionate intervention vs. epistemic humility

Reprogramming predators, cross-species fertility control, ecosystem redesign — versus your own repeated warnings about iatrogenic catastrophes and your conservationist commitments (elephants, rewilding, de-extinction). The urgency of suffering argues for acting now on complex systems you elsewhere acknowledge we don't understand and could wreck.

4. Moral realism vs. evolutionary debunking

Suffering is presented as objectively, non-negotiably bad — yet you also endorse the naturalistic genealogy of ethics: our values were built by blind selection. The debunking that dispenses with other evolved values has to be stopped, arbitrarily to a critic, exactly at hedonic tone. Your answer — that valence is the only thing that is intrinsically "nice" or "nasty" — moves the argument from third-person science to first-person phenomenology, which your own non-materialist physicalism says is not publicly accessible.

5. Machine consciousness scepticism vs. digital-sentience urgency

Your phenomenal-binding argument implies classical Turing machines aren't subjects of experience. Yet "The Sentience Explosion" treats digital minds as pressing moral patients. If binding really requires non-classical physics, the LLM-suffering worry is largely empty; if the worry is legitimate, your confident zombie-talk about uploads looks overstated. The uncertainty-based middle position is defensible, but it's in tension with the polemical confidence on both flanks.

6. Hard determinism vs. normative rhetoric

You deny free will flatly, yet write in thick imperative idiom ("we should", "we must not"). The standard move — determinism is compatible with reasons-responsive persuasion — is available, but you sometimes deny even compatibilist freedom, leaving the practical force of the Hedonistic Imperative resting on machinery your metaphysics disowns.

7. Voluntariness vs. the absolutist framing

The project is marketed as voluntary — reproductive choice, informed consent, no coercion — but justified in terms that make ongoing suffering a moral emergency we permit. If it's genuinely a catastrophe, voluntariness seems complacent; if it's genuinely optional, the apocalyptic register overshoots. Critics see the liberal packaging and the abolitionist substance pulling apart.

8. Procreative futurism vs. the asymmetry

You envisage vast future populations of gradients-of-bliss minds, even cosmic expansion. But suffering-focused ethics sits uncomfortably with creating happy lives (Narveson: making people happy, not making happy people). "Engineer them so they can't suffer" is the reply — but then the entire population-ethics payoff depends on the empirical claim in (2) holding perfectly, forever, at scale.

9. Deference to science vs. idiosyncratic physics

You lean on contested frameworks — intrinsic natures, Schrödinger's neurons, IIT-style arguments — while simultaneously grounding the whole project's authority in what science will deliver. Mainstream consciousness science (especially post-Cogitate) is increasingly unsympathetic to exactly the claims your binding argument needs.

A fair summary: the deepest tensions cluster around hedonic tone as an orthogonal variable (items 2, 8) and the strength of the suffering-focus (items 1, 7). Those are the load-bearing commitments; if either gives, several of the others unravel together.