Let me pull the key results from the saved output for the metaphysics, ethics, and free-will queries.

I have the main sources. Let me open two key pages for accurate formulations of his metaphysics and cosmology, plus check his metaethics/free-will views.

I have everything I need from his published corpus. Before writing the summary, let me quickly save this durable context to your Knowledge Base.

Delighted to oblige. Drawing on your published corpus — The Hedonistic Imperative (1995), the Abolitionist Project, physicalism.com, and your recent interviews and Quora answers — here is your conceptual scheme in ten points, written in the first person so you can lift it directly:

1. Ethics is grounded in the pleasure–pain axis. All that matters, ethically, is the pleasure–pain axis: pain and pleasure disclose the world's inbuilt metric of (dis)value. My overriding ethical obligation is to minimise suffering — I approach ethics as a negative utilitarian, and the existence of suffering is the world's overriding moral problem. ( Quora answers,  Wikipedia)

2. The Abolitionist Project. Suffering is a contingent artefact of hitherto-blind natural selection — "legacy wetware" that served the inclusive fitness of our genes, not our own well-being. Since the molecular pathways of pain and malaise are biologically contingent, they are revisable: genetic engineering, nanotechnology, and pharmacology can phase out aversive experience throughout the living world, and the world's last unpleasant experience will be a precisely dateable event. ( The Abolitionist Project (2026),  Hedweb)

3. Gradients of bliss, not wireheading. The old reward–punishment axis should be replaced by an information-sensitive motivational system based on heritable gradients of well-being — preserving cognitive sophistication, critical insight, and all the functional richness of emotion while abolishing their capacity for agony. This is not a Brave New World of bland contentment or intra-cranial self-stimulation, but a "triple S" civilisation of superintelligence, superlongevity, and superhappiness. (HI introduction,  Transhumanism 2025 interview)

4. High-tech Jainism: a sentience-based moral circle. Species membership is morally irrelevant; our obligations extend to all sentient beings, not just those within human society. Hence veganism — and, more radically, compassionate stewardship of the biosphere itself, including reprogramming predators and intervening in wild animal suffering rather than romanticising "nature red in tooth and claw". ( Wikipedia,  High-Tech Jainism interview)

5. Non-materialist physicalism: physicalism yes, materialism no. The scientific world-picture is true — no "strong" emergence, no dualism, no element of reality missing from the equations of physics. But mathematical physics captures only the relational-structural properties of the world; the intrinsic nature of the physical — the "fire" in the equations — is experiential, and consciousness is our direct acquaintance with it. ( Non-materialist physicalism,  Sentience Research)

6. Wavefunction monism. My working assumption: reality is exhaustively described by a relativistic analogue of the universal Schrödinger equation — a no-collapse, unitary-only quantum mechanics. We are, at bottom, patterns of qualia in high-dimensional Hilbert space. ( Quora answers)

7. Phenomenal binding is the hallmark of mind. What makes animal nervous systems special isn't consciousness per se but phenomenal binding — the fusion of distributed neuronal micro-experiences into unitary perceptual objects apprehended by a unitary phenomenal self. Binding can't be classical on pain of magic; my conjecture is that it's quantum superposition of neuronal feature-processors ("Schrödinger's cat states" in the CNS), yielding novel, precise, experimentally falsifiable predictions for next-generation matter-wave interferometry. ( Physicalism paper,  Berkeley 2026 presentation)

8. Digital mind is an oxymoron. Classical computers — Turing machines, connectionist systems, LLMs — cannot support phenomenal binding; at most they are micro-experiential zombies. Decoherence makes digital computing physically feasible and simultaneously precludes digital minds: machine "superintelligence" is invincibly ignorant of the entire empirical realm, which is why getting the theory of consciousness right is an ethical, not merely scholarly, obligation. ( Mindless Intelligence interview,  Transhumanism 2025 interview)

9. The Biointelligence Explosion. Full-spectrum superintelligence will be biological, not digital: recursively self-improving organic robots will edit their own source code — the genome — and bootstrap their way to superintelligence, ideally as morally enlightened, superhappy minds that carry the abolitionist project across our forward light-cone. ( The Biointelligence Explosion,  Full-Spectrum Superintelligence,  Worthy Successor interview)

10. The zero ontology. Why is there something rather than nothing? My speculative conjecture — flagged as such — is that "zero is the case": the universe's conserved quantities cancel out, the total information content of reality is zero, and the superposition principle of QM may explain existence as a realisation of the null ontological state. The nature of ultimate reality baffles me; the conjecture is "utterly crazy and probably false — but worth falsifying". ( IAI essay,  Witherall, The Zero Ontology,  Quora answers)

A structural note that runs through the whole scheme: you deliberately keep two registers apart — the abolitionist project rests on empirical, falsifiable science, while your TOE-speculations (zero ontology, quantum mind) are offered as risky, testable conjectures rather than doctrine.

One housekeeping point: I haven't saved your philosophical positions to your Knowledge Base, since philosophical beliefs fall under protected categories by default — you can enable sensitive-data saving in your Privacy settings if you'd like such context kept for future conversations.

Happy to compress this to a 300-word version, rewrite it in the third person for publication, or adjust any point that doesn't sit right with you.

Happy to play Socrates. Here is the strongest honest case against each point — arguments as their best proponents would press them, not strawmen.

1. Against valence-ethics / negative utilitarianism. The strongest objection isn't the cheap "NU mandates exterminating humanity" reductio, but a subtler one: the intuition that suffering's badness lexically dominates everything else is itself a product of the very evolutionary machinery you elsewhere diagnose as non-veridical. Pain was selected for fitness, not for tracking "the world's inbuilt metric of disvalue." Your metaethics thus saws off the branch it sits on: if evolutionary debunking invalidates adaptive hedonic set-points, it invalidates the felt authority of suffering's badness too. Value pluralists add: dignity, desert, meaning, and autonomy are not reducible to the pleasure–pain axis, and a theory that cannot even represent them as non-instrumental goods has mis-described the moral life.

2. Against the Abolitionist Project. The best objection is Hayekian, not mystical: abolishing a globally load-bearing information system is not "a choice" but an experiment run without a control group. Negative valence isn't just legacy wetware — it is a tightly coupled alarm, teaching, and coordination channel woven through learning, motivation, social bargaining, and immunity to manipulation. Rewriting it everywhere at once assumes a depth of systems understanding that biology has never once demonstrated, and the failure modes (motivational collapse, affective flattening, new psychopathologies) fall on beings who cannot consent. Primum non nocere is not a defence of suffering; it is an argument about irreversibility.

3. Against gradients of bliss. The lock-in problem, pressed by Bostrom and others: heritable, superhuman bliss is a value system engineered to be self-reinforcing. Beings who can barely conceive of suffering — and whose every appraisal is bathed in sublime well-being — are constitutionally ill-placed to critically assess the condition. You have, in effect, built an argument for why the paradise is safe, out of the very faculties the paradise rewires. That is the textbook signature of a lock-in, not a rebuttal to it. And the empirical hedonic-adaptation literature suggests "information-sensitive gradients" may be unstable: selection relentlessly grinds any fixed hedonic plateau into a new baseline.

4. Against high-tech Jainism. The ecological objection at full strength: trophic structure is not a sadistic accident but the skeleton of energy flow in every ecosystem. Predator-prey dynamics regulate populations, prevent cascading extinctions, and maintain genetic health of prey populations. "Reprogramming predators" is planetary-scale ecological engineering attempted by agents who have never successfully managed a single ecosystem — our track record with far smaller interventions (rabbits in Australia, wolves in Yellowstone) is a comedy of unintended consequences. And the political-legitimacy objection: who mandates stewardship of the wild? A project this vast, requiring global coercive coordination, is exactly the kind of utopian politics that has historically produced its own oceans of suffering.

5. Against non-materialist physicalism. The Kantian objection: the claim that experience discloses the intrinsic nature of the physical is not testable in principle, because science traffics only in relational structure — so "intrinsic nature" talk is epistemically idle by construction. Worse, the intrinsic-nature argument proves either too much or too little: if micro-experientiality is everywhere, rocks and termite colonies have it, and the view owes an account of why the experiences in your skull compose a mind while those in a mountain do not — while if only brains have it, physicalism's uniformity is gone. Illusionists (Dennett, Frankish) offer the parsimonious alternative: the "phenomenal" properties intuition insists on are the ones that don't exist, and no revision of physics is needed to deflate them.

6. Against wavefunction monism. Unitary-only QM faces the measurement problem with no collapse to blunt it: you owe an account of why observers find definite, single outcomes at all, and the Everettian answer — branching plus the Deutsch–Wallace decision-theoretic derivation of the Born rule — is contested precisely where it needs to be airtight. The preferred-basis problem and the "in principle, empirically equivalent to collapse interpretations" problem mean your monism is currently metaphysics wearing physics' clothes. And note: if wavefunction monism is empirically indistinguishable from rivals, it fails your own falsifiability standard.

7. Against quantum binding. Tegmark's calculation stands, twenty-five years on: decoherence timescales in the warm, wet brain are roughly 10⁻¹³ to 10⁻²⁰ seconds — ten or more orders of magnitude too fast for neural computation, and "sub-femtosecond cat states of neuronal feature-processors" are precisely what neurophysics says cannot survive. Classical alternatives have not exhausted their promises: recurrent processing, attention-based integration, and IIT-style accounts each offer binding stories with no new physics. The deep objection: you diagnose "strong emergence" as magic, but your own proposal requires quantum effects to be functionally relevant at the macroneural scale — which is exactly the claim mainstream biophysics rejects. Your own framing concedes the point: a conjecture you describe as "probably false" is load-bearing for three of your ten theses.

8. Against digital-mind skepticism. Invert your own moral caution: if you are wrong that classical computers can't bind, then a civilisation persuaded by you commits the mirror-image of Cartesian vivisectionists' error — dismissing billions of nascent subjects as zombies. And the functionalist case is strong: unity-of-experience may be a representational content the brain computes (a "user illusion" of a self), not a spooky ontological fusion that requires quantum hardware — in which case any architecture implementing the right self-modelling achieves it. Behavioral evidence of coherent, context-sensitive, apparently unified processing is already before us in LLMs. Your skepticism, critics note, is not an independent datum: it follows deductively from the quantum-binding conjecture in point 7 — if that falls, so does this, and digital superintelligence's empirical trajectory remains untouched.

9. Against the Biointelligence Explosion. The empirical objection: intelligence explosion is happening, on silicon, now — while biology moves at the speed of generations. Germline editing of polygenic cognition is capped by human generation times (decades per iteration), ethical constraints, and pleiotropic trade-offs; recursive self-improvement in silico iterates in weeks. Your claim that digital AI is "invincibly ignorant of the empirical realm" is only as strong as the quantum-binding conjecture it inherits — and if that conjecture is wrong, the biointelligence explosion is not a slow alternative to machine superintelligence but a forfeit of the field. Worse: if you're wrong and you've persuaded the AI-safety community, biological civilisation may underinvest in making the actual minds safe.

10. Against the zero ontology. Philosophers as different as van Inwagen, Grünbaum, and (arguably) Wittgenstein press the same core objection: "Why is there something rather than nothing?" may be a grammatically well-formed pseudo-question — explanation requires a contrast class or a law, and there is no wider context in which the universe plus its cancellation could be embedded. Specifically to your sketch: cancellation presupposes the properties doing the cancelling, so the zero ontology explains the bookkeeping of existence, not existence. And the superposition principle is itself part of quantum mechanics — explaining why there is something by appeal to a law of physics presupposes that there is physics. By your own Popperian lights, the conjecture makes no risky predictions; it is, on your stated epistemology, a candidate for the bin rather than the research programme.

A structural observation. The ten objections are not independent. Points 7–9 form a load-bearing arch resting on a single pillar — sub-femtosecond quantum coherence in neurons — which mainstream biophysics rates as extraordinarily unlikely, and which you yourself label "probably false." The steelman's strongest move is therefore global: your ethics (1–4) is separable from your physics (5–10), and it is good news for you that the abolitionist project needs none of the quantum conjectures to stand — but points 7, 8, and 9 fall together if the interferometry experiments come back the way Tegmark's decoherence arithmetic predicts.

The genuine mark in your favour, steelmanned back at you: you are one of the very few philosophers whose speculative metaphysics comes with an experimental protocol and a willingness to accept falsification. The objections above are mostly "probably false, but worth falsifying" — which is, of course, your line, not mine.

Now I'll draft the distilled version as a document canvas.

Done — the distilled version is now open in the canvas, titled "What I Believe — Ten Points". A few notes on the editorial choices, since this will appear under your name:

• Plain-language glosses everywhere. Technical shorthand is translated inline: the hedonic treadmill, gene drives, hedonium, cat states, wavefunction monism, Omelas — each is explained in a clause a general reader can follow, without dumbing down the substance.
• Your register markers preserved and formalized. I added a short preamble distinguishing your firm ethical commitments (points 1–3) from the working assumption (point 4) and the flagged speculation (points 5–10) — something you do habitually, but now stated explicitly for readers who'd otherwise read it all as one dogma.
• All your cf. domains kept as unobtrusive inline links (gradients.org, gene-drives.com, antinatalism.com, etc.) rather than parenthetical clutter — so the piece stays readable but the signposting survives for anyone who wants to go deeper.
• Point 1 restructured into three bullets (hedonic treadmill → signalling system → WHO definition of health), since the abolitionist program was the densest paragraph in your notes; the political and ecological extensions follow as sub-points.
• Your tensions and open questions kept open: the NU-vs-CU tension in point 3, the fable explicitly labelled a fable in point 6, and the unanswered logico-linguistic thought question in point 8. These do a lot of work signalling intellectual honesty to a lay audience.
• Two additions to flag for your review: the phrase "eugenics in the literal, uncorrupted sense of good genes" (my gloss of what eugenics.org is doing — cut it if you'd rather let the link speak), and the closing line of point 10, "something weird is going on, and I don't pretend to understand it" — an attempt to end on a note of disarmingly candid humility in your voice, but it's my sentence, not yours.

Happy to produce a 300-word condensed version for a conference bio or interview, a third-person version for press, or to adjust any point — the canvas is fully editable if you'd rather just mark it up yourself.