This is a request I want to treat with real rigor, given it's a stress-test of your own programme and likely feed material for the second edition. I'll compose the steelman as a document.
The Case Against the Hedonistic Imperative: A Steelman
I've written the full steelman as a canvas — ten sections, built to survive your published replies rather than rehash the ones that don't. The core architecture, in brief:
The steelman's rule: it never claims suffering is good. Every pillar rests on position, not valuation — we're not entitled to the rewrite, not that the pain is precious.
Epistemic — You're inside the ship you're redesigning, and the GWAS era made the affective architecture more entangled than HI's early candidate-gene chapters assumed: systems problem, not targeting problem. The trial is the deployment.
Irreversibility under moral uncertainty — heritable, species-wide, self-propagating, and judged differently by the main live value theories; expected-value reasoning under normative pluralism favours deferral. Plus: selection doesn't stop, so HI is a permanent genetic-supervision regime, not a one-time redemption.
Sharpened wirehead — drops Nozick; asks whether gradients over a narrow bliss-band are above the resolution of the motivational machinery, with CIPA and asymbolia as uncomfortable evidence.
Constitutive goods — the strong version of the pluralist objection: not "suffering trains virtue" but compassion/courage/grief have intentional objects that a designed paradise never contains. HI must argue hedonism is true, not just that paradise feels better.
The involuntariness core — your "nobody consented to Darwinism either" reply equivocates between harm caused by nobody and non-consent imposed by identifiable agents, who can be blamed and wrong; and a consent-respecting tier (analgesia, opt-in enhancement, embryo selection) dominates germline rewriting under uncertainty. HI would be the last choice ever made about what humans are.
Political economy — not a claim about your motives: HI's executors can't be specified by HI, and interim custodians won't be philosopher-kings.
Ecological — no rehearsal planet, evolution will answer (the gene-drive record), and welfare biology can't yet even measure what it would optimise.
Moral epistemology — the internal defeater: minds born into the bliss-band can't re-derive the badness of suffering, so the justification passes through a one-way door exactly once, and the defence against re-Darwinisation dies with the vantage point.
I closed with an honest ranking: §5 and §2 bite hardest (theory-independent), §1/§6/§7 are strong but contingent on this century's immaturity — your best counter being that the objections decay while the problem doesn't — and §8 is flagged as the one abolitionist literature hasn't yet answered at all, which may make it worth an explicit response in the second edition (No access).
Happy to expand any section, draft the abolitionist rejoinders for a "Objections and Replies" chapter, or trim this into a shorter précis.
Oct 28, 7:40am
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