Nov 15, 5:48pm

This is the crux of the zero ontology's second half: even granting that the conserved constants and the world's informational content cancel to exactly zero, that is a formal result. It tells us the structure of the totality, not what the terms being summed are made of. So the question "why should cancellation be experiential?" is exactly the right pressure point. Here is how I'd argue it, and where the argument is weakest.

1. Why cancellation should have an experiential character

The relata must be categorical, not just formal. A non-trivial cancellation presupposes terms that are "positive" and "negative" prior to cancelling. A zero that decomposes into a plenum of non-zero terms is not the trivial zero of an empty domain; it is the zero of a fully populated one. So the ontology is committed to intrinsic grounds for the informational terms, and the question of their nature is precisely the question Russellian monists say the equations cannot answer. Structure cancels; whatever cancels cannot itself be mere structure, or the regress of pure dispositions grounds nothing.

Acquaintance is the only non-structural datum available. Any completion of "the intrinsic nature of the informational terms is X" is either another structural description (which collapses back into the formalism and explains nothing) or an identification with something known non-relationally. There is exactly one candidate we are acquainted with from the inside: phenomenality. The experiential reading is thus not an addition to the zero ontology but its only non-arbitrary completion. Every alternative is a placeholder.

The self-intimation argument. The zero ontology is proposed, checked, and found compelling within experience. The theorist who sees the cancellation is himself part of the plenum whose sum is zero. On the unknowable-quiddity reading, the theory can never close the loop between formalism and the reality that grasps it: the formalism describes structure, the quiddities are opaque, and the act of understanding the theory is a brute leftover. On the experiential reading, the ontology is self-interpreting. That closure is not a decoration; it is what any "explanation of existence" must achieve to count as an explanation rather than a bookkeeping trick.

2. Steelmanning "experience is the intrinsic nature of the physical"

  1. Physics is complete but purely structural: it characterises its terms only by dispositions, symmetries, and relations (Russell 1927). It answers "what does this do?", never "what is this?".
  2. Pure structure is ontologically incomplete. Dispositions need categorical grounds; a world of nothing-but-powers is a regress of promissory notes.
  3. Therefore there are intrinsic natures, and physics is silent about them, not eliminative of them.
  4. We are directly acquainted with one intrinsic nature: experience. It is given rather than described. Crucially, by the structuralist criterion of the physical, experience is not excluded from the physical; it is the one physical state whose intrinsic nature is disclosed rather than inferred.
  5. Physics is causally closed, and experience is causally efficacious (pain behaviour, report, adaptive value). So experience cannot be an extra ingredient alongside the physical; it must be identical with the categorical grounds of physical dispositions.
  6. Parsimony over kinds: one known kind of intrinsic nature. Postulating a second, unknowable kind for the rest of reality multiplies entities where continuity is the default.
  7. Therefore physics is the mathematical structure of experience. The physicalist description survives intact; only the ontological reading is inverted. This is physicalistic idealism, not a rejection of physics.

3. What favours it over the formally equivalent unknowable alternative

The rival (panprotopsychism, or type-F monism with Russellian humility) agrees on every formal point: physics is structural, categorical grounds exist, they are absent from the equations. So the choice cannot be settled formally. Four criteria favour the phenomenal version:

  • Internal completeness. The zero ontology's own standard is that the explanation must account for every property, since a missing property would change the sum. An unknowable intrinsic nature is precisely an unclosable remainder: a theory that by stipulation cannot say what its terms are fails its own completeness requirement. The experiential version cashes the note the structuralist version merely writes.
  • Asymmetric explanatory payoff. Formally equivalent ontologies are not evidentially equivalent when one renders the datum expected and the other leaves it miraculous. Only the phenomenal version explains why there is experience at all. The unknowable version must add a brute psychophysical bridge, i.e. the hard problem survives untouched, now wearing Russellian clothing.
  • Symmetric residual mysteries, asymmetric tractability. The phenomenal version trades the hard problem for the combination problem, which is empirically approachable (binding, synchrony, field topology, IIT-style measures, however contested). The unknowable version's residual mystery is in principle closed to inquiry: it forbids its own solution. A mystery you are permitted to investigate beats one you are not.
  • The lopsidedness problem. A universe of unknowable quiddities that nevertheless generates theorists acquainted with one quiddity from inside is bizarre. Either acquaintance is a general guide to intrinsic nature, or it is an isolated miracle. The phenomenal version generalises the single known case; the rival treats it as an unexplainable exception.

There is also, speculatively, a hedonic extension: if intrinsic nature is experiential, then the sign-structure of the cancellation (positive/negative terms summing to zero) need not stay formal. Valence becomes a candidate for what the signs are, and the "hedonic zero" a candidate for what the sum is. That would make the answer to "why anything?" and the answer to "what is it like?" the same answer. Whether that is a deep unification or a category mistake is, I think, the most interesting open question in the whole scheme.

4. What would settle it

The honest costs: the combination and grain problems, plus the worry that acquaintance itself may deliver only structure (the structuralist turn against introspection). What would decisively favour the phenomenal reading is a principled structural signature of phenomenality in the formalism, a mapping between features of the equations and features of experience simpler on the experiential reading than on any other. What would weaken it is evidence that experience supervenes on structure with no categorical work left for it to do. Until then the choice is abductive, and the decisive datum is the one the "formally equivalent" rival can only bracket: the single case of intrinsic nature we know by being it.

The zero ontology framing above follows Arthur Witherall's exposition of it on HedWeb (The Zero Ontology).

Nov 15, 5:48pm

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