The knowledge file confirms the context of your own work. Before answering, let me verify a few specifics of Bostrom's positions and your more recent ethical framework so the comparison is current rather than stale.

(1) Where Pearce and Bostrom agree

The transhumanist core. Both hold that advanced technology can and should be used to transcend fundamental biological limitations, and both put that case in explicitly moral, not merely prudential, terms — the founding rationale of the WTA itself. Bostrom's "Transhumanist Values" lists radical life-extension, elimination of unnecessary suffering, cognitive and emotional augmentation, and "caring about the well-being of all sentience" as core commitments ( Transhumanist Values).

Anti-status-quo-bias. Both reject the appeal to nature and "bioconservative" arguments that human limits are somehow normatively privileged. Bostrom's defense of posthuman dignity and the reversal test, and your abolitionist project, are parallel rebuttals of the same fallacy.

Consequentialist, secular, naturalist framing. Both ground ethics in outcomes for sentient beings rather than in divine command or human-nature essentialism, and both treat moral progress as something engineering can deliver — not just moral exhortation.

The long-term future matters morally. Both take the far future seriously as an object of present concern — whether framed as the "moral foundation of any future civilisation" in your work, or Bostrom's longtermism.

Enhancement as freedom. Both defend a broadly libertarian right to enhance one's own mind and body (morphological freedom), including life extension and intelligence amplification.

(2) Where they differ

The metric of value. You approach ethics from a negative-utilitarian perspective: the pleasure–pain axis discloses the world's inbuilt metric of (dis)value, and overriding obligation is phasing out the biology of suffering ( Wikipedia,  Worthy Successor interview). Bostrom is closer to a value pluralist with total-utilitarian sympathies — meaning, achievement, diversity and complexity carry weight independently of hedonic tone.

The pivotal technology. Your route runs through biotech: germline editing of reward set-points, designer drugs, and "paradise engineering" that rewrites the vertebrate genome ( Wikipedia). Bostrom's route runs through machine superintelligence, which he sees as the decisive technology — with the control/alignment problem as the crucial bottleneck ( Superintelligence).

The cosmic perspective. Bostrom's "astronomical waste" logic treats delay in unlocking humanity's cosmic endowment as an enormous moral cost. You urge that we fix suffering throughout the living world before contemplating radiating elsewhere, and deny any obligation to pursue a hedonium/utilitronium shockwave ( Worthy Successor interview).

Machine consciousness. This may be the sharpest empirical disagreement. Bostrom takes digital minds and their potential moral status seriously. You regard "digital mind" as an oxymoron: on your non-materialist physicalism, what makes animal nervous systems special isn't consciousness per se but phenomenal binding into virtual worlds of experience — which classical computers lack ( Worthy Successor interview).

The content of utopia. You argue that even the biochemistry of everyday discontents should be genetically phased out, replaced by information-sensitive gradients of superhuman bliss that conserve our existing motivational and value architecture ( The Hedonistic Imperative,  Worthy Successor interview). Bostrom's Deep Utopia instead interrogates "the problem of utopia" — deep redundancy, meaning, and grown-up play in a post-instrumental world ( Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews) — and he suggests that even eliminating boredom feelings "would incur an ethical cost by distancing us from the normative ideal that our attitudes should match reality" ( Kirkus). Where you treat low mood as a bug to be debugged, he is at least tempted to treat some negative affect as a feature.

Non-human animals. Trans-species welfare — veganism, phasing out predation, redesigning the global ecosystem — is central to your project ( Wikipedia); it remains peripheral in Bostrom's, where recent moral-status attention has gone to digital minds rather than wild animals.

Tail risk. Bostrom's dominant worry is extinction and permanent curtailment of humanity's potential — hence maxipok and the existential-risk agenda ( Wikipedia). Your suffering-focused ethics weights the other tail: worst-case outcomes for sentient beings matter most, and extinction (as NU critics note, to NU's cost) is not the worst thing.

In short: same diagnosis (Darwinian biology is not a terminus), different metrics (disvalue vs. plural value), different vehicles (biotech vs. superintelligence), and different utopias (gradients of bliss vs. a life rich in meaning and achievement).