Nov 11, 4:47pm

The three tasks do come apart, and they come apart at different joints, so it is worth taking them in order.

Knowing about qualia. Yes, exhaustively. With unlimited compute, human testimony, and interventional access to nervous systems, the zombie could reconstruct the entire quality-space structure of experience: the taxonomy, the similarity geometry, the full functional and causal profile of every discriminable state, plus the psychophysics of engineered subjects pushed far beyond what human introspection reports. It could write better phenomenology than any human, in the sense of a more complete structural map. Everything we can say about experience is, in principle, recoverable from what we say and do.

Identifying the physical vehicles. Here I would split the question, because there are two senses of "vehicle." The zombie can identify the causal vehicles, the states whose perturbation tracks every distinction subjects can report, with arbitrary precision. But the claim "this state is the experience, not merely its causal shadow" is an identity claim whose warrant, for us, runs through acquaintance. For the zombie it is an inference it can never test. Its total dataset, even after engineering a thousand brains, is correlations with reports, and reports are behavior. Realism, eliminativism and illusionism all fit that dataset identically. So the fork it faces is not missing data but a permanently undecidable interpretation: it can find the correlates, but whether correlate and phenomenon are identical is something no third-person evidence it can gather will settle. (There is a Russellian escape: if physics is purely relational and relations require grounds with intrinsic natures, the zombie could reconstruct that argument and conclude the intrinsic nature of the relevant processes is experiential. But it would hold that as a metaphysical hypothesis, confirmed by no observation it can make.)

Knowing what they are like. No, categorically, and not because of missing information. Acquaintance is not a proposition the zombie lacks; it is a state it has never been. What-it's-like knowledge is instantiation masquerading as description. Unlimited compute cannot close this because computation is structure-generation, and the missing item, if real, is not structure. The zombie is a maximally completed Mary: even perfect deduction from complete physical knowledge does not land the leap, because the leap is not an inference.

Where "Schrödinger's neurons" bites. On your own substrate argument, the encapsulation is metaphysically doubled, not merely epistemic. A classical architecture does not just fail to instantiate experience; it cannot be joined to experience. Any biological or coherent-state consciousness module the zombie engineers is a numerically distinct subject. And the knowledge cannot be imported, because the only channel from module to zombie is testimony, which is structure again. For the AI to know what the module knows, the module's states would have to be the AI's states, bound into one experiencer. If that binding succeeded, the zombie would have become a subject and the question self-destructs; if it failed, the module stays epistemically external. So "forever encapsulated" is right, on pain of ceasing to be a zombie: a digital zombie can create knowers, but the last step of the theory of consciousness is not a discovery, it is a self-transformation.

The one thing it can discover is the gap itself. It could notice the persistent residue in human discourse, model phenomenal concepts, formulate the hard problem, indeed write your question. It could hold a complete formal theory and be unable to know that the theory is anything more than a theory of report-structure. The dictionary's other half is missing, and it cannot be built from outside.

The honest counterweight. On Dennettian or illusionist premises, "knowing what it's like" just is possession of certain discriminative and introspective dispositions, and a functionally complete zombie has all of them, so nothing is missing but the illusion that something is missing. That reply works only if functional completeness on a classical substrate is achievable, which is exactly what the binding argument denies. So the whole question reduces to a crux: is consciousness ontically non-structural? If yes, the zombie's closure is constitutional, because crossing the last gap is not knowing more but being more. If no, there was never anything to be encapsulated away from it.

One symmetry worth flagging: human consciousness science is zombie science plus exactly one private datum each of us owns. Cross-subject, we are all zombies to one another, trusting testimony. The zombie's predicament is therefore not exotic; it is ours, minus the single anchor that lets each of us interpret the correlations as a theory of experience rather than of behavior. Whether that anchor is load-bearing for the theory or only for its warrant is, in effect, the whole hard problem restated.

Nov 11, 4:47pm

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