The IAI article confirms this is philosopher David Pearce's conjecture. Let me gather more detail from his own writings on it.

The informationless zero ontology is a conjecture by the philosopher David Pearce (author of The Hedonistic Imperative) that aims to answer the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" with the answer: there is, in a rigorous sense, precisely nothing to explain — the total information content of reality is zero ( IAI TV).

The problem it addresses

We can't rigorously specify a "default state" of nothingness. Every attempt — a dimensionless point, a timeless void, a quantum vacuum — smuggles in something: laws, properties, structure. And specifying anything at all requires information. Since information is fundamental in physics and cannot be created or destroyed (no wavefunction collapse, no destruction in black holes), the natural question becomes: where did the information in the universe come from? ( IAI TV)

Pearce's answer: it didn't come from anywhere, because the net information content of reality is necessarily zero.

The core moves

1. The superposition principle formalizes "inexistence." In quantum mechanics, amplitudes are complex numbers, so summing two amplitudes can yield zero — having two ways for something to happen can make it not happen (destructive interference). Pearce proposes that this applies to the universe as a whole: the superposition principle is a timeless logico-physical principle that "explains everything, including itself," and the informationless zero ontology is the default condition from which any notional departure would need explaining ( IAI TV,  hedweb).

2. Cancellation, not absence. If Everettian (no-collapse) quantum mechanics is right, reality is a single vast quantum-coherent superposition of orthogonal relative states — each "world" equally real. The zero condition isn't an inky void or a simple yin-yang balance of opposites, but a multi-dimensional (perhaps infinite-dimensional) cancellation process: the universe subsists in one pure entangled state "whose properties cancel out precisely to zero," while individual quasi-classical branches only approximately cancel — the residual "anomalies" showing up as quantum interference effects and EPR correlations ( stafforini PDF,  hedweb).

3. "Informationless" has two readings.

• Zero by cancellation: the values of all physical (and perhaps experiential) quantities across the total superposition sum to zero, just as all of mathematics can be derived from the empty set ( Qualia Computing).
• Zero by exhaustion: if all possible descriptions are satisfied — every string vacuum, geometry, and value of consciousness realized somewhere in the multiverse — then reality as a whole carries zero information, since a structure that satisfies every possible description rules nothing out. The critic's jibe "a theory that explains everything explains nothing" is, on this view, exactly the point ( hedweb).

4. There is no asymmetry to explain. The question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" presupposes that something and nothing are exclusive alternatives. On the zero ontology they are not: the "something" of everyday experience is the universal manifestation of zero properties, so the question rests on a false dichotomy — a condition of zero properties rigorously defined is richer than an inky void, one that includes sticks, stones, and people, whose local occurrence is inseparable from the global conservation of zero ( stafforini PDF,  Witherall).

Status, falsifiability, and criticism

Pearce presents it as purely speculative — a sketch of an explanation-space, not a theory. But it's not untestable: it would be cleanly falsified by any experimentally detected departure from unitarity (genuine wavefunction collapse), or by a negative result in the "Schrödinger's neurons" interferometry experiment proposed in his non-materialist physicalism ( hedweb). Traditional collapse interpretations of QM are already inconsistent with the conjecture — if you see a live cat, your doppelgänger must see a dead one ( hedweb).

The main philosophical criticism (Arthur Witherall) is that showing "there is nothing to explain" is a necessitarian move — close to claiming the world exists by logical necessity — and that it transforms the question into the equally perplexing "Why is there both-something-and-nothing-together?", which the conjecture can only answer if it can explain its own truth ( Witherall, PhilPapers,  hedweb).

In short: the conjecture holds that reality is an informationally null object — a zero expressed as, not contrasted with, the sum of everything — with the superposition principle of quantum mechanics as the formal instrument of that nullity.